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1. INTRODUCTION
The Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 embracedfundamental and far-
reaching changes to the U.S. system of personaland corporate income
taxation. These changes were motivated by a desire toreduce the distor-
tionary impact of taxation on economic activityand to promote a more
equitable distribution of the tax burden.Accordingly, the legislation
implemented lower marginal tax rates and "leveledthe playing field" by
eliminating the special treatment of many items.
One significant portion of the TRA amendedthe U.S. system of alter-
native minimum taxes (henceforth AMTs),which limit the extent to
which individuals and corporations can reduce taxliabilities through the
use of preference items.The new base for the corporate AMT consists of
taxable income plus a variety of preference items,including (most nota-
bly) the difference between normal andaccelerated depreciation allow-
ances on real property andone-half of the difference between taxable
income and book income (to be replaced by earningsand profits after
1989). Corporations pay the maximum oftheir conventional and AMT
liabifities, where the latter is calculated by applying aspecified tax sched-
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ule to the AMT base. When corporate income is sufficientlyhigh, the
AMT is simply 20 percent of the corresponding base,compared to 34
percent for the regular corporate income tax. Since the AMTemploys a
larger base and a lower rate, itmay be either higher or lower than the
conventional tax and is more likely to come into play forcompanies that
make greater use of preference items.
The inclusion of these AMT provisions in the 1986 Actwas primarily
motivated by Congress's desire to make the federal incometax system
more equitableor, at very least, to make it appearmore equitable.
Policymakers were particularly eager to eliminate thespectacle of compa-
nies with large book earnings paying littleor no income taxes. As a
secondary matter, Congress also anticipated that theseprovisions would
raise a significant amount of revenue. In particular, forecastsplace AMT
collections at about $5.3 billion in fiscal 1988,up from only $500 million
per year under prior law. Some studies (for example, Lucke, Eisenach,
and Dildine; 1986) suggest that the longer-runimpact of the AMT on
corporate tax liabilities will be much more modest, primarily dueto
provisions that allow corporations to credit AMTpayments against fu-
ture regular tax liabilities. More realistic simulations (Dworin,1987a and
198Th) contradict this conclusion.
Aside from promoting equity while preservingrevenues, the TRA of
1986 was also intended to reduce the distortionaryimpact of taxes on
economic activity. Yet, to date, the impact of the AMTon incentives and
behavior has received very little attention. One importantexception is a
study by Graetz and Sunley (1986). Their analysissupported an un-
equivocal conclusion: "If only efficiency considerationswere relevant,
the minimum tax would likely be condemned by all."
The Graetz-Sunley argument follows from the observationthat the
AMT affects average and marginal tax ratesvery differently. In particular,
it represents an attempt to "level the playing field" bydistributing the tax
burden more equally This amounts toa partial equalization of average tax
rates. Yet marginal tax rates are the key determinants of investmentincen-
tives. Moreover, the marginal tax rates associated with theAMT and the
conventional tax appear to be quite different. Consequently, theeffective
marginal tax rate for any given firmmay depend to a great extent on the
firm's exposure to the AMT. Since thisexposure differs across firms, the
AMT may significantly distort the allocation ofcapital.
This paper challenges the Graetz-Sunley view. Iargue that the AMT
not only levels the playing field in terms ofaverage tax rates (as was
intended) but also rather fortuitously tends to equalizemarginal tax
rates. Overall, its impact should be to reduce the distortionaryimpact of
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In section 2, I consider the impactof the AMT on economic activity
within firms and conclude that minimum taxprovisions promote more
uniform effective tax rates over different typesof physical capital invest-
ments, other inputs, and sourcesof finance. In the absence of an AMT,
the current tax system would heavilyfavor debt finance, and would
impose the lowest effective burden on assetsfalling into the seven-year-
life Accelerated Cost Recovery System(ACRS) category. When a com-
pany is exposed to the AMT,these advantages and the resulting distor-
tions of real and financial decisions maybe significantly smaller. In
particular, the AMT reduces the effective tax rate onequity-financed
investments and reduces the effective taxsubsidy to debt-financed in-
vestments. The convergence betweeneffective tax rates is susbstantial.
In section 3, I consider the impactof the AMT on the distribution of
capital and economic activity across firms.Using firm-level data from
Standard and Poor's Corn pustat file, I show thatthe incidence of the AMT
is likely to be very uneven. Differencesin exposure to the AMT are
systematic, so that some industries willordinarily incur much larger
AMT liabilities than others. This is hardlysurprising, since minimum tax
provisions are intended to compensatefor the excessive use of prefer-
ence items by certain firmsand industries. Unfortunately, it also raises
the possibility that, as argued by Graetzand Sunley, the AMT could
significantly distort the allocation of capital acrossfirms. Yet, my analy-
sis indicates that such concerns aregroundless. If firms used only a
single source of funds (either debt, equity, orretained earnings) to fi-
nance investments, thenthe AMT would indeed create very uneven
incentives. However, since the AMT tends toreduce both the next tax
burden on equity and the net tax subsidy todebt, its effect on the
weighted average cost of capital for a typicalfirm is minimal. In addition, it
wifi also tend to raise effective tax rates onfirms for which these rates are
low (for example, those relyingdisproportionately on debt capital) and
to reduce effective tax rates onfirms for which these rates are high (for
example, those relying disproportionately onequity capital). Thus,
while the burden of the AMT is very uneven acrossfirms, its impact on
marginal tax rates is notindeed, it mayactually compress the range of
prevailing rates. Consequently, the AMT maywell improve the alloca-
tion of capital across firms and industries.
Aside from investment, the AMT might alsodistort the organization
of economic activity by promoting otherwiseunprofitable mergers and
leases, which essentially allow firms totrade tax preferences. Previous
research strongly suggests that the impact on mergeractivity will be
small. Unfortunately, existing studies tell uslittle if anything about the
likely impact on leasing. Whileanecdotal evidence suggests that the72Bernheim
AMT has encouraged leasing in some specificcases, I argue that the
aggregate impact on leasing will be minimal. I support thisargument
with empirical analysis. Usinga sample of firms drawn from the
Compustat file, I study the relationship betweenexposure to the AMT
and leasing activity subsequent to the TRA of1986. While it is still too
soon to reach any definite conclusions, I am unable to findany evidence
supporting the view that exposure to the AMTencourages leasing.
In summary, I find that the AMT reduces the distortionaryimpact of
corporate taxation on decisions taken within firms andon the allocation
of capital across firms. It is also likely that adverseeffects on leasing and
merger activity will be small. Overall, the AMT should havea positive
impact on economic incentives
2. THE IMPACT OF THE AMT ONECONOMIC
ACTIVITY WITHIN FIRMS
In exploring the effects of the AMTon capital budgeting and financial
structure, I will focus on provisions relating to the treatmentof deprecia-
tion. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 modified the ACRSto provide for a
variety of asset classes. For three-, five-,seven-, and ten-year assets, the
system prescribes the 200 percent declining balance method,switching
to the straight-line method at a point to maximize deductions.Fifteen-
and twenty-year assets receive similartreatment, except that the 150
percent declining balance method is employed initially. For residential
rental and nonresidential real property, the straight-linemethod is used.
To determine AMTI (alternative minimum taxableincome), firms recalcu-
late depreciation allowances as follows. For three-, five-,seven-, ten-,
fifteen-, and twenty-year property, the recalculationis based on the 150
percent declining balanceswitching to straight-line method,using the
asset's class life, rather than its ACRSrecovery period, as its service life.
AMT depreciation for residential rental and nonresidentialreal property
is based on the straight-line method, assuming forty-yearservice lives.
The difference between ACRS and AMT depreciationis then added to
taxable income.
In this section, I modify the methodology ofKing and Fullerton (1984)
in order to calculate effective tax rateson assets in each of the relevant
ACRS categories under the current tax law bothwith and without the
AMT provisions. In principle, this isa very different calculation since
firms typically do not know in advance whether regularor alternative tax
provisions will apply, and since the relevant provisionsmay change
with the firm's performance during the productivelife of the asset in.
question. Two assumptions render the problem tractable. First,I assumeIncentive Effects of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax73
that investors are risk-neutral, so that I do not have to consider the effect
of alternative minimum taxation on risk premiums. Second, I assume
that firms are not permitted to carry forward or backward any excess
taxes paid under the AMT. For this second assumption, one mayalso
substitute (with some reinterpretation of parameters) the supposition
that firms can carry AMT tax liabifities forward or backward without
limitation at the market rate of interest. In practice, investors are risk-
averse, and firms have some limited ability to carryforward excess AMT
payments as credits against future regular tax liabilities. Accordingly,
these calculations should be regarded as a first pass at the issue of
investment incentives, rather than the final word.
The King-Fullerton methodology presupposes that investors require
some rate of return, p. before personal taxes(this might, for example, be
the interest rate available on bonds of comparable quality). Corporate
investments must provide this required rate of return after meeting cor-
porate tax liabilties. Thus, corporations must earn some other rate of
return, p. before corporate taxes. The rate p is often referred to as the
"cost of capital." In the appendix to this paper, I derive an expression for
p under an income tax system thatincludes AMT provisions. In the
absence of personal and corporate taxes, p would simply equal r, the real
rate of return available on other investments. The differencebetween p
and r reflects the burden of corporate taxation on corporate investment.
Thus, it is appropriate to define the effective tax rate, T, as follows:
T=Pr.
r
Note that T measures the effective rate of corporate taxation. It does not
reflect the wedge induced by the personal tax system and therefore
should not be interpreted as a comprehensive measure of the tax burden
on capital income.
To calculate the cost of capital and the effective tax rate, one must
specify the characteristics of the tax system and the investment in ques-
tion. Throughout, I will assume that the regular corporate tax rate, r, is
0.34, and that the Alternative Minimum Tax rate,, is 0.20.For the
purpose of making illustrative calculations, I wifi assumethat the com-
pany in question has a 20 percent probability of incurringAMT liabilities
in any given year (in the notation of the Appendix,= 0.2). This falls
within the range of probabilities calculated by Dworin (1987a), who simu-
lated the tax experience of "representative" companies under the new
tax law. I will take the real market rate of return, r, to be 5 percent,and
the rate of inflation,iT,to be 3 percent (so that the nominal market rate of74Bernheim
return, i,is 8 percent). I calculate the present value of depreciation
allowances (henceforth denoted D) by applying the actual depreciation
rules for each of the seven ACRS asset categories. For residential rental
and nonresidential real property, I use service lives of 27.5 and 31.5
years, respectively. To calculate the present value of depreciation allow-
ances under the AMT system (henceforth denoted D*), I use the mid-
point of the class life range for each ACRS category (for example, seven-
year property corresponds to assets with class lives between ten and
sixteen years; I use thirteen). True economic depreciation (denoted 6 in
the Appendix) is very difficult to measure. For the purpose of making
illustrative calculations, I take 6 to be the inverse of the assumed class life
for each asset category.
As in King and Fullerton's analysis, the cost of capital and the effective
tax rate depend critically on the source of financing for the investment in
question. In the next three subsections, I present calculations for three
different sources of funds: new equity issues, retained earnings, and
debt.
2.1 Equity Finance
Above, I have identified types of investments by two parameters: D, the
value of depreciation allowances per dollar of investment under the
regular tax provisions, and D*, the value of allowances under the AMT
provisions. In general, both D and D* lie between zero and one (that is,
firms receive positive deductions, but these deductions are notas favor-
able as immediate expensing). Since ACRS allows accelerated deprecia-
tion, we always have D> D*. The difference between these two terms
represents the tax preference, P. for a particular investment (that is, P =
D_D*).
As it turns out, the impact of the AMT on effective tax rates depends
critically on both the base level of depreciation allowances, D*, and the
level of tax preference, P. Using the expressions derived in the Appendix,
one can show that the AMT does not alter effective tax rates whenever
P = y(lD*), (1)
where
7=
Whenever the preference level is greater than that given by equation
(1), the AMT raises the effective tax rate. However, whenever the prefer-Incentive Effects of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax75
ence level is less than that given by equation(1), the AMT actually
reduces the effective tax rate. Indeed, as long as preference levels are not
too high, the AMT could theoretically reduce effective rates across the
board in all investmelit categories, despite the fact that it increases reve-
nues. The tax rate on preference items may evenfall relative to that on
some nonpreference items. To see how this may occur,consider two
investments, one of which is depreciated and the other of which is
expensed. Suppose that the AMT regulations entail slower depreciation
for the first asset bUt still allow expensing of the second asset (so that the
second, though expensed, is not a preference item). For the expensed
asset, we have P = 0 and D* = 1. Equation (1) then implies that the AMT
does alter the effective tax rate on this asset. Yet, as I have already
argued, the AMT may reduce the tax rate on the asset that receives
preferential treatment under the ordinary tax system.
These conclusions may at first seem surprising. After all, the AMT is
supposed to represent an additional tax on preference items. The expla-
nation for this puzzle is that the AMT imposes a large inframarginal tax
burden, since it is applied to a base that exceeds regular taxable income.
The effective tax rates discussed throughout this paper are marginal tax
rates (this is appropriate, since only marginal rates affect incentives). By
imposing a lower statutory rate (rather than r), the AMT tends to
reduce the fraction of each incremental dollar that the corporation pays
to the government, even though it raises taxes as a fractionof ordinary
taxable income. As long as the level of tax preference is not too high, this
effect will dominate. For assets with very large tax preferences, the
lower statutory rate is more than offset by the loss of incremental depre-
ciation allowances, and so the AMT raises the effective tax rate.
One interesting feature of equation (1) is that it does not contain, the
probabffity that a firm will incur AMT liabilities. Thus, if the AMT raises
(or lowers) the effective tax rate on a particular type of asset, it will do so
for all firms. While the magnitude of the effect of the AMT on the cost of
capital depends upon the firm's characteristics, the direction of this effect
does not.
Another important conclusion following from equation (1) is that the
creation of an AMT may compress the range of effective tax rates on
assets of different types. This would contribute to efficiency by reducing
distortions between various categories of investments. Suppose, in par-
ticular, that we fix the base level of depreciation allowances, D*, and
vary the level of tax preference, P. Higher values of Pimply that the
asset is taxed at a lower rate under the ordinary corporate income tax.
Equation (1) implies that the AMT raises tax rates on assets with higher
values of P and lowers tax rates on assets with lower values of P. Thus,76Bernheim
the AMT tends to equalize effective tax rates for assets with similar
values of D*.
Similarly, one can hold the level of tax preference fixed at some level P
and compare tax rates across assets that are depreciated differently un-
der AMT regulations. A very similar picture emerges. For fixed P. the
effective tax rate is a decreasing function of the AMT depredation allow-
ances, D*. Equation (1) implies that for low values of D* the AMT re-
duces the effective tax rate, and for high values of D* the AMT increases
the effective tax rate. Thus, the introduction of an AMT tends to equalize
effective tax rates across different classes of assets.
Despite these observations, it is not the case that an AMT necessarily
reduces the differences in tax rates between all categories of investments.
Consider, for example, two investments, one of which is depredated and
the other of which is expensed. Suppose, as in our earlier example, that
AMT regulations entail slower depreciation of the first asset but still per-
mit expensing of the second. In the absence of an AMT, the effective tax
rate on the depredated asset is higher. The imposition of an AMT does not
affect the tax rate on the expensed investment. Yet it is possible that the
effective tax rate on the depredated asset will rise, thereby creatingan
even larger gap between the rates imposed on these two investments.
The key issue of whether the AMT raises or lowers effective tax rates
on investments that receive accelerated depreciation, and the associated
question of whether the AMT compresses the range of effective tax rates,
can only be resolved in the context of a particular tax system. Accord-
ingly, I now turn my attention to calculations based on the current (1988)
U.S. tax law. Substitution of the relevant values forTand i- reveal that y
= 0.515. Using this formula, it is possible to determine whether the AMT
increases or decreases the effective tax rates on different categories of
assets, by computing actual preference levels and comparing them with
the corresponding break-even levelsthat is, the levels of P described
by equation (1). The results of these calculations are contained in Table 1.
Note that in every category, the actual preference is less than the break-
even preference level. Thus, the current AMT reduces effective marginal
tax rates on all classes of equity-financed investments that receive prefer-
ential treatment under ACRS.
To assess the magnitude of this reduction, I calculate effective tax rates
for each asset category based on current law with and without AMT
provisions. The results are contained in Table 2. This table explicitly
confirms the finding that the AMT reduces effective tax rates on tax-
preferred investment categories. The decline in rates ranges from 0.3
percentage points (for seven-year assets), to more than 5 percentage
points (for residential rental property). In most cases, there is roughly anIncentive Effects of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax 77
TABLE 1
ACRS and Break-Even Preferences
for Equity Finance
8 to 10 percent decline in the effective rate subsequent to the introduc-
tion of the AMT. The impact of the AMT on incentives is therefore
potentially large.
These calculations also illustrate a significant compression of the range
of effective tax rates. In the absence of an AMT, the difference between
the highest and lowest tax rate is 25.5 percentage points; with an A1VIT,
this difference is only 20.5 percentage points. Furthermore, tax rates
converge for every pair of asset categories, with only one exception
(rates for five- and ten-year assets diverge slightly). Finally, bear in mind
that some inputs (labor, advertising, and so on) are expensed and that
the effective tax rate on an expensed input is zero. Since the AMT re-
duces tax rates on depreciable investments, there is therefore also com-
pression of tax rates among a wider class of inputs.
TABLE 2








3-year 200 percent 0.898 0.025 0.053
5-year, 200 percent 0.785 0.084 0.111
7-year, 200 percent 0.651 0.169 0.180
10-year, 200 percent 0.565 0.188 0.224
15-year, 150 percent 0.502 0.113 0.256
20-year, 150 percent 0.444 0.091 0.286
Residential 0.300 0.065 0.360








3-year, 200 percent 30.5 27.9
5-year, 200 percent 26.1 24.8
7-year, 200 percent 23.6 23.3
10-year, 200 percent 26.9 26.0
15-year, 150 percent 37.5 34.3
20-year, 150 percent 41.4 37.3
Residential 46.0 41.4
Nonresidential 49.1 43.878Bernheim
Two central conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the AMT
reduces effective tax rates on equity-financed depreciable investments
and may thereby reduce adverse investment incentives created by the
corporate tax system. Second, the AMT causes compression of the range
of effective tax rates on productive inputs, thereby reducing the distor-
tionary effect of the corporate tax system on the choice of inputs.
2.2 Internal Finance
When a corporation reinvests earnings, shareholders can defer realiza-
tion of those earnings into the future. This deferral lowers the effective
tax rate on investment income. Thus, shareholders may well demand a
lower rate of return1 after corporate tax (but before personal tax), on
internally financed investments than on equity-financed investments. In
terms of my notation, p may be lower with internal finance (see King and
Fullerton for a more complete discussion). It is therefore necessary to
recalculate the cost of capital and the effective tax rate for each class of
investment.
In spite of this consideration, the qualitative analyses of effective tax
rates under new equity and internal finance are extremely similar. In
particular, equation (1) continues to define the break-even tax preference
level for which the AMT leaves effective tax rates unchanged. Of course,
since the source of finance determines the firm's discount rate, p, it also
affects the present discOunted value of depreciation allowances (D and
D*). It is therefore at least theoretically possible that, for some asset
category, the AMT lowers the effective tax rate when the investment is
financed with new equity and raises the effective tax rate when it is
financed with retained earnings.
Once again, these issues can only be resolved within the context of a
particular tax system. Actual calculations of effective tax rates on inter-
nally financed investments require knowledge about personal, as well as
corporate, tax rates. Under the current tax laws, marginal personal tax
rates are either 15, 28, or 33 percent. One would expect corporate stock-
holders to be concentrated among the relatively wealthy, so that an
appropriate weighted average of these rates would produce a number
near the top end of the range. On the other hand, various kinds of
nontaxed institutions (especially pension funds) hold a significant frac-
tion of corporate equity. For ifiustrative purposes, I assume that the
effective personal tax rate on ordinary income (denoted m in the Appen-
dix) is 0.25. As information becomes available from tax returns in 1988
and later, it will be appropriate to refine this number. While the 1986 Tax
Reform Act eliminated the capital gains exclusion, the advantage of tax
deferral remains. A common estimate is that deferral cuts the effectiveIncentive Effects of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax79
tax burdenhalf; I will therefore assume that the effective tax rate on
capital gains (denoted z in the Appendix) is 0.125.
Using these parameter values, I obtain the results displayed in Table 3.
Note that, as before, the AMT reduces the effective tax rate on every
asset category. For internal finance, the declines range from 0.2 percent-
age points to 4.1 percentage points. Thus, the tax on preference items
once again turns out to be favorable toward the use of preference items.
As with equity finance, there is also significant compression of the range
of effective tax rates. In the absence of the AMT, the difference between
the highest and lowest rate would be 19.8 percentage points; with the
AMT, this difference is only 15.9 percentage points. In addition, conver-
gence of effective rates occurs between virtually all individual pairs of
asset categories. Note that assets in the five-, seven-, and ten-year catego-
ries have negative effective tax rates, which implies that they are subsi-
dized on the margin. The presence of the AMT increases this subsidy
and therefore accentuates distortions between these investment catego-
ries and expensed inputs.
2.3 Debt Finance
When a corporation finances an investment by issuing debt, it must
promise bondholders a rate of return before personal taxes at least as
great as that available on alternative investments (r). However, since
interest payments are tax deductible at the corporate level (whereas
dividends and capital gains are not), the required return on such an
investment before corporate taxes (that is, the cost of capital) is substan-
tially lower under debt finance than under either of the other financing
options considered above. It follows that effective tax rates on debt-
TABLE 3








3-year, 200 percent 2.7 0.6
5-year, 200 percent 1.5 2.5
7-year, 200 percent 4.0 4.2
10-year, 200 percent 1.7 2.3
15-year, 150 percent 6.7 4.2
20-year, 150 percent 9.7 6.6
Residential 13.2 9.7
Nonresidential 15.8 11.780Bernheim
financed investments are much lower than those on equity-financed or
internally financed investments.
There are qualitative as well as quantitative differences between effec-
tive tax calculations under debt and equity finance. In particular, when
the corporation uses equity or retained earnings, its rate of discount
depends only upon investors' required rate of return and on parameters
of the individual income tax system. In contrast, with debt finance, the
corporation's rate of discount depends on the value of interest deduc-
tions, which is in turn determined by parameters of the corporate tax
system. This observation has extremely important implications for the
AMT. When a corporation incurs AMT liabilities, it pays taxes at a lower
marginal rate (T rather than Tx). Thus, the AMT diminishes the value of
interest deductions, both in the aggregate and on the margin. As a
result, exposure to the AMT is much more likely to increase a firm's cost
of debt capital than its cost of equity or internal capital. In addition, the
lost value of interest deductions will depend critically on the probability
that a firm will incur AMT liabilities. It follows that the break-even tax
preference level described by equation (1) will, under debt finance, de-
pend on characteristics of the corporation (specifically, 4)).
I quantify the impact of the AMT on effective tax rates by employing
the formulas developed in the Appendix. Results are presented in Table
4. Note that the effective tax rates in this table are all negative, which
indicates that corporate tax system provides a subsidy to marginal debt-
financed investments. This finding reflects the deductibility of interest
payments and is consistent with the results of other authors.
Several patterns emerge from the above calculations. First, the AMT
generally increases the effective tax rate on debt-financed investments.
TABLE 4








3-year, 200 percent 35.3 31.6
5-year, 200 percent 39.1 34.5
7-year, 200 percent 41.5 36.3
10-year, 200 percent 40.2 35.2
15-year, 150 percent 34.7 30.6
20-year, 150 percent 32.9 29.0
Residential 31.1 27.3
Nonresidential 29.2 25.7Incentive Effects of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax81
Increases range from 3.5 to 5.2 percentage points. This stands in sharp
contrast to the results of the preceding subsections. Second, there is still
a general tendency toward compression of the range of effective tax
rates. In the absence of the AMT, the difference between the highest and
lowest tax rates for depreciable investments is about 12.3 percentage
points; with the AMT, this difference falls to 10.6 percentage points. In
addition, we observe convergence of effective tax rates for all but a few
pairs of investment categories.
Although the AMT increases effective tax rates for depreciable invest-
ments under debt finance, it is still likely to reduce the overall level of
distortion in production. Recall that for equity and retained earnings, tax
rates in the absence of the AMT were for the most part positive, and that
the AMT pushed these rates toward zero, thereby reducing distortions
between depreciated and expensed inputs. For debt finance, tax rates in
the absence of the AMT are negative; in raising these rates, the AMT
once again pushes them toward zero, thereby reducing distortions be-
tween depreciated and expensed inputs.
These observations also imply that the AMT reduces the tax advan-
tages of debt as a source of financing. Specifically, a comparison of the
entries in Tables 2 and 4 reveals that the AIVIT significantly compresses
the range of effective tax rates for debt and equity capital. For example,
the effective tax rate on debt-financed, fifteen-year assets is, in the ab-
sence of an AMT, 72.2 percentage points lower than the rate for equity-
financed, fifteen-year assets. However, in the presence of the AMT (and
under the assumption that the firm incurs AMT liabilities with 20 per-
cent probability), this differential closes to 64.9 percentage points
roughly a 10 percent reduction (7.3 percentage points) in the tax wedge.
The AMT should therefore contribute to the efficiency of corporate capi-
tal structure.
Overall, the AMT generally compresses effective tax rates across
classes of investments, other inputs, and sources of financing. It is there-
fore likely to reduce economic losses arising from the distortionary ef-
fects of taxes on the internal decisions of individual firms.
3. THE IMPACT OF THE AMT ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY ACROSS FIRMS
All of the calculations in the preceding section refer to a single firm with
a given probability of incurring AMT liabilities. If this probability differs
across firms, then the introduction of the ArviT may create differences in
effective marginal tax rates where none existed previously, and this
could distort the allocation of capital among firms. Noting this potential82Bernheim
effect, Graetz and Sunley concluded that the AMT would probably have
undesirable effects on economic efficiency.
The uneven incidence of the AMT may also affect the organization of
economic activity. In particular, many analysts have predicted that the
AMT will significantly stimulate mergers and leasing arrangements (see,
for example, the Wall Street Journal, 1987). Such transactions have the
effect of transferring the ownership of tax preference items to companies
that do not expect to pay taxes under the AMT provisions and that
therefore can reap the full benefits of favorable tax treatment.
The effect of mergers on AMT liabifities is straightforward. Through
merger, the "excess" taxable income of one firm can beused to offset the
"deficit" of book income over taxable income for the other firm, thereby
eliminating AMT exposure and reducing the total tax liability. The im-
pact of leases is considerably more complex. A lease allows the lessee to
reduce marginal AMT liabilities by reporting the same expense for book
and tax purposes. However, in contrast to mergers, incremental leases
do not affect the inframarginal AMT liabilities experienced by the lessee.
Furthermore, the lease transfers income to the lessor, who is more likely
to pay taxes at the higher marginal rate i-rather than atComplex and
ingenious lease provisions may therefore be required to reduce total tax
liabilities.
Leasing and mergers are not merely paper transactions. It is well
known that institutional arrangements affect the efficiency of economic
activity. Leasing may arise naturally in an undistorted economy for a
variety of reasons, and the extent of leasing will, reflect a balance be-
tween the costs and benefits of this activity. In some cases, the lessor
may have an absolute advantage in maintenance of equipmentand may
provide upkeep as part of the lease. Advantages are counterbalanced by
disadvantages, such as the incentive problems that develop when the
lessee does not bear the full cost of wear and tear on equipment. It is
important to realize that these advantages concern real economic re-
sources and that the artificial stimulation of otherwise unprofitable leas-
ing or mergers promotes inefficiency.
The quantitative importance of the various distortions noted above
depends critically on the variation in exposure to the AMT across firms.
Since the new AMT provisions have been in place for a very short time,
accurate measurement of this variation is problematic. Exposure to the
AJv1T must be inferred from historical relationships between taxable in-
come and book income.
Using data from Standard and Poor's Compustat file, I have con-
structed a rough index of exposure to the AMT. The motivation for this
index is as follows. Firms incur AMT liabffities whenever 20 percent ofIncentive Effects of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax83
the AMT base (henceforth denoted A) exceeds 34 percent of regular
taxable income ('). Equivalently, the AMT kicks in whenever YIA <
0.59. While Compustat does not contain either Y or A, certain proxies are
available. As a rough approximation, the AMT base is equal to taxable
income plus one-half of the difference between gross-of-tax book income
(B) and taxable income. This implies that, roughly speaking, firms incur
AMT liabilities whenever YIB <0.42. Although data on book income (as
well as federal and foreign tax liabilities) are available, data on taxable
income are not. In its place, I use actual federal tax liabilities, T. Assum-
ing that corporate tax liabilities were 46 percent of taxable income prior
to 1986, the AMT would apply whenever TIB < 0.19. This last step
involves two additional approximations. First, tax liabilities were not
uniformly equal to 46 percent of taxable income. Second, the TRA of
1986 changed the taxable income base, so that even a precise measure of
taxable income prior to 1987 would not be entirely appropriate. Never-
theless, TIB provides a useful index exposure to the AMT.
For any given firm in any year, extraordinary events may produce
extreme values of TIB. One extreme value does not indicate that that
firm has systematically greater exposure to the AMT. In order to average
out these unusual events, I calculate TIB by pooling firms in Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) two-digit industries. In addition, I com-
pute three- and five-year averages of TIB in order to average out the
effects of unusual industry-wide events that might have occurred in
particular years. Large variations in multiple-year, industry-wide aver-
ages of TIB would constitute strong evidence that firms in some indus-
tries are significantly more exposed to the AMT than those in other
industries. This would raise the possibility that the AMT significantly
distorts the allocation of capital between firms and industries, and it
would also point to the potential existence of large incentives for merg-
ers and lease arrangements.
My calculations are based on a sample of 852 firms, representing 53
two-digit industries. Firms were excluded from this sample if any of the
critical variables were unavailable during the period 1982 through 1987.
Industry-level results are presented in Table 5. One immediately notices
a great deal of variation in the index of exposure to AMT liabilities (rIB).
It is somewhat easier to evaluate the magnitude of this variation by
consulting Table 6, which summarizes the distribution of indices. For
both three- and five-year averages, the index of exposure is less than
0.15 for roughly one-third of the industries. Firms. in these industries
must be viewed as having very high exposure to the AMT. The reader
will note that, in a small number of cases, the index was actually nega-
tive. For two industries, this occurred because firms recorded positive84Bernheim
TABLE 5
Indices of AMT Exposure b,Industry
SIC classification













































5800 0.252 0.261tax payments but negative book income. The index does not indicate
high exposure to the AMT in these unusual cases. For both three- and
five-year averages, the index exceeds 0.30 for roughly 30 percent of the
industries. Firms in these industries must be viewed as having relatively
little exposure to the AMT.
These calculations confirm the impression that there is substantial and
persistent variation in the probability of incurring AMT liabilities both
across firms and across industries. This is hardly surprising, since mini-
mum tax provisions are intended to compensate for the excessive use of
preference items by certain firms and industries. Nevertheless, this find-
ing raises the very real possibility that the AMT significantly distorts
both the allocation of capital and the organization of economic activity,
as argued by Graetz and Sunley. In the remainder of this section, I argue
that this appearance is misleading. Despite the existence of large and
persistent differences in exposure to the AMT, the resulting distortions
will most likely be negligible.
Consider first possible distortions involving the allocation of capital
across firms and industries. One might be inclined to evaluate the poten-
tial significance of these distortions by making calculations such as those
presented in Table 2. Previously, I interpreted these numbers as effec-
tive tax rates for a single firm with and without the AMT. One might also
interpret them as effective tax rates for firms with differing probabilities
of incurring AMT liabilities (specifically, 0 and 20 percent). Under this
alternative interpretation, the figures suggest that the AMT creates sub-
stantial differences between effective marginal tax rates across firms.
This is in essence the argument advanced by Graetz and Sunley.
Yet this argument is misleading. One must consider that the average
firm does not rely exclusively on a single source of investment funds but
instead strives to achieve some optimal capital structure through the
balanced use of new equity, debt, and retained earnings. Such a firm
evaluates potential investments by applying a weighted average cost of
capital. While it is true that the AMT reduces effective tax rates for equity-











Distribution of Indices of AMT Exposure
0.50
financed and internally financed investments, it raises effective tax rates
for debt-financed investments. These effects are, for the average firm,
roughly offsetting.
I illustrate this point by calculating effective tax rates based on the
weighted average cost of capital for "representative" firms that differ only
in their exposure to the AMT. Statistics presented by King and Fullerton
indicate that approximately 60.2 percent of the average investment dollar
comes from internal funds. New equity issues provide 4.8 percent of
investment funds, while borrowing provides 34.9 percent. I use these
weights in computing the weighted average cost of capital for each firm.
In addition, the average firm also uses a variety of different assets. King
and Fullerton's figures indicate that buildings comprise roughly one-half
of the corporate capital stock. I assume that all such buildings are nonresi-
dential. Lacking data on the distribution of other assets over the six other
ACRS categories, I assume for illustrative purposes that the representa-
tive firm uses three-, five-, seven-, ten-, fifteen-, and twenty-year assets in
equal proportions.
Effective tax rate calculations based on the weighted average cost of
capital are presented in Table 7. Note that I have made separate calcula-
tions for firms that will incur AMT liabilities with probabilities of 0, 20,
40, 60, 80, and 100 percent. The most striking feature of Table 7 is that
the effective tax rate is almost entirely independent of exposure to the
AMT. Firms that incur AMT liabilities with 20 percent probability pay an
Range





Less than 0 5 4
0.00toO.05 5 5
0.05 to 0.10 4 6
0.10 to 0.15 4 4






0.45 to 0.50 2 0
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TABLE 7
Effective Tax Rates for Weighted Average Cost of Capital
effective rate that is less than 0.2 percentage points higher than the
effective rate for firms that never incur AMT liabilities. Indeed, there is
practically no variation (less than 0.4 percentage points) in the effective
tax rate for firms with AMT exposure running from 0 to 80 percent.
While firms that face the AMT with certainty experience larger declines
in effective tax rates, the differences are still very small in comparison
with the differences noted in section 2.
One might well argue that not all firms employ the three sources of
investment funds in these representative proportions. Among the class
of firms that rely primarily on equity, the AMT will have an uneven
impact, lowering effective marginal tax rates more for firms with high
probabilities of incurring AMT liabilities. Likewise, the AMT will also
have an uneven impact among firms that rely primarily on debt, raising
effective tax rates more for firms with high probabilities of facing the
alternative tax. Yet the overall effect is to reduce the variation in effective
tax rates among all firms. The effective tax rates of representative firms
(those with typical capital structures) are essentially unaffected by the
imposition of the AMT. The effective tax rates of firms that are taxed
lightly on the margin (that is, those that rely heavily on debt) tend to rise
toward the average, and the effective tax rates of firms that are taxed
heavily on the margin (that is, those that rely heavily on equity) tend to
fall toward the average. While the size of the movement toward the
average tax rate for any given firm depends upon that firm's probability
of incurring AMT liabffities, this does not alter the fact that the alterna-
tive tax compresses the range of effective tax rates around the mean.
Furthermore, these effects are probably substantial in light of the calcula-
tions summarized by Tables 2, 3, and 4. Thus, if anything, the AMT
equalizes effective marginal tax rates and improves (in the sense of effi-












I now turn to issues concerning the organization of economic activity.
The extent to which the AMT stimulates leasing and mergers is still
largely a matter of speculation. There is, however, some highly sugges-
tive evidence concerning mergers. Incentives for mergers arise from a
variety of tax provisions. One of thesethe treatment of tax-loss carry-
forwardshas existed for some time. Yet a detailed study of corporate
mergers by Auerbach and Reishus (1987) revealed that tax consider-
ations played a very small role in actual transactions. It is highly unlikely
that the AMT will alter this situation.
In contrast, the use of leases as tax-avoidance schemes is very familiar,
and there are certainly individual cases in which the AMT has placed a
significant role (see the Wall Street Journal, 1987). Yet it is not at all
obvious that the aggregate impact of the alternative tax on leasing activ-
ity will be very large. Because leases have nontax advantages and disad-
vantages, tax considerations may in most cases be of secondary impor-
tance. In addition, AMT-oriented leases tend to be very complex. A
simple lease transfers both ownership and income to the lessor. The
lease contract must guarantee the lessor his or her required rate of return
after tax and still leave something for the lessee. This is possible only if
the effective marginal tax rate of the lessor is less than that of the lessee.
Since the AMT narrows the range of effective tax rates, it reduces the
scope for tax-oriented leases of this simple form. There is some indica-
tion that the leasing industry has in a few instances succeeded in design-
ing more complex contracts that transfer the tax advantages of prefer-
ence items from companies that face the AMT to companies that do not.
These contracts have the disadvantage of being cumbersome and may in
some cases be of dubious legality. At a minimum, companies that enter
such contracts risk having them invalidated by the IRS or Congress.
Preliminary data on leasing activity under the new tax regime are now
available and shed some light on the quantitative importance of the
issues discussed above. One might be inclined to examine the overall
level of leasing activity to see whether this activity accelerated after
passage of the TRA. Unfortunately, this exercise is likely to prove unin-
formative. The TEA of 1986 included a number of provisions that would
tend to depress leasing. These include the elimination of the investment
tax credit and the reduction of depreciation allowances. If leasing activ-
ity remained near its previous levels, this might reflect offsetting tax
effects. Furthermore, if it deviated from past levels in either direction,
this could be attributed to general economic conditions. We simply do
not have sufficient experience with the AMT or sufficient variation in
other tax parameters to judge the AMT's impact on leasing from aggre-
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The alternative is to use firm-level data. If the AMT stimulates leasing,
then leasing among firms with systematically greater exposure to the
AMT should have risen between 1986 and 1987 relative to leasing among
firms with little exposure. Earlier in this section, I argued that the ratioof
federal income tax to gross-of-tax book income provides an approximate
measure of exposure to the AMT. It ispossible to construct this
measureeither for individual firms or industriesusing data con-
tained in the Compustat files. In addition, Compustat also contains firm-
level data on leasing. Reported corporate liabilities include capitalized
lease obligations, and most companies separately report the present
value of noncapitalized leases (a lease is classified as capitalizedif it
transfers property ownership to the lessee, if it contains a bargain pur-
chase option, if the lease term is equal to 75 percent or more of the
economic life of the property, or if the present value of minimum lease
payments equals or exceeds 90 percent of the fair value of theproperty).
Together, these data permit an exploratory analysis of the relationship
between the AMT and leasing.
For each of the firms in my sample, I constructed the index of expo-
sure to the AMT based on 1986 book incomeand tax payments. Since
1987 tax payments were uncharacteristically high for firms that actually
paid the alternative tax, it was inappropriate to use the current (1987)
value of this index. I then created two variables measuring the change in
lease obligations between 1986 and 1987. The first variable is thechange
in capitalized lease obligations between 1986 and 1987,scaled by the
firm's assets in 1986. The second variable measures the change in
noncapitalized lease obligations and is constructed in the same way. In
addition to making the sample restrictions mentioned earlier, I dropped
all firms that reported negative book income or total assets in 1986.
Using the firm-level data described above, I was unable to discern any
systematic relationship between exposure to the AMT and the change in
lease obligations between 1986 and 1987. The correlation between the
index of AMT exposure and the change in capitalized leases was 0.003.
To the extent the AMT stimulates leases, one would haveexpected this
correlation to be negative. Furthermore, the estimated correlation coeffi-
cient was not statistically distinguishable from zero at any reasonable
level of confidence. While the correlation between the index of AMT
exposure and the change in noncapitalized leases wasnegative, its value
was only 0.007, and it too wasstatistically indistinguishable from zero.
The lack of significant correlation does not necessarily imply that the
quantitative relationship between the variables in question issmall. The
importance of this relationship may simply be obscured byvariance
arising from other sources. It is therefore useful to summarize these90Bernheim
relationships through simple regressions. I present results in Table 8.
Here I would like to draw attention to the magnitudes of the estimated
coefficients rather than to their statistical significance (in view of the
correlation coefficients, it should come as no surprise that the coeffi-
cients are statistically indistinguishable from zero). The coefficient of the
index of AMT exposure is, of course, positive in the equation for capital-
ized leases. While the corresponding coefficient is negative in theequa-
tion for noncapitalized leases, it is very small. To interpret this coeffi-
cient, consider two hypothetical firms. Suppose that their indices of
AMT exposure are 0.1 and 0.4 (that is, toward the extremes of the ob-
served range). The regression estimates indicate that, on average, non-
capitalized leases would have increased by about 0.707 percent of assets
for the firm with high AMT exposure and 0.702 percent of assets for the
firm with low AMT exposure. It is hard to argue that the difference-
0.005 percent of assets, or about 0.75 percent of the change in non-
capitalized leasesis of much economic significance.
It is certainly possible that the lack of a significant relationship reflects
the fact that my index of AMT exposure is a very poor proxy for true
exposure. By aggregating over industries and averaging over time as
before, one might obtain a better measure of the systematic and persis-
tent exposure to AMT liabilities. I have therefore constructed measures
of the change in lease obligations by industry (scaled by the assets of the
industry) and calculated correlations with the five-year averages of
industry-exposure indices listed in Table 5 (correlations based on three-
year averages are similar) Surprisingly, these correlations are positive.
For capitalized obligations, the correlation coefficient is 0.071, while for
noncapitalized obligations, it is 0.295. The latter coefficient is significant
at the 95 percent level of confidence. There is certainly no indication that
firms in industries with systematically high exposure to the AMT in-
creased leasing more between 1986 and 1987 than did firms in industries












Index of AMT exposure 0.0020 0.018
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I have made no attempt in the preceding analysis to control for nontax
factors that might explain changes in lease activity. In addition, it is
possible that the impact of the AMT on leasing will develop slowly over
a period of years and that the. effect in the first year was uncharacteristi-
cally small. For these reasons, one must regard my calculations as pre-
liminary and exploratory. Nevertheless, the absence of the predicted
effect is striking and should help to minimize concern that the AMT will
significantly distort leasing decisions.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have studied the impact of the corporate AMT on capital
budgeting and financial decisions within firms as well as on the alloca-
tion of capital and economic activity across firms. My calculations reveal
that the AMT compresses the range of effective tax rates on alternative
classes of investments and sources of financing, thereby reducing the
distortionary impact of taxation on decisions taken by individual firms.
In addition, although the incidence of the AMT is very uneven, this does
not contribute significantly to the disperson of effective marginal tax
rates across firms. For firms with typical financial structures and invest-
ment profiles, effective tax rates are almost entirely independent of expo-
sure to AMT liabilities. Furthermore, the AMT tends to move effective
tax rates for atypical firms toward the mean, thereby reducing the distor-
tionary impact of taxation on the allocation of capital across firms. Fi-
nally, there is little reason to believe that the AMT will have a significant
impact on the organization of economic activity. Previous evidence sug-
gests that merger activity will probably be unaffected. Some exploratory
analysis of data from Standard and Poor's Compustat file reveals little or
no relationship between systematic exposure to the AMT and recent
changes in leasing activity. Therefore, despite the fact that the AMT was
not motivated by efficiency considerations, it seems compatible with the
goals of minimizing tax distortions and promoting economic efficiency.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix, I derive expressions for the cost of capital under a
corporate income tax system that includes AMT provisions. Consider a
firm that maintains a steady-state production profile with the input vec-
tor x. Define the units of input so that the price of one unit of each type
of input is $1. The input vector x results in production y according to the
stochastic relationship92Bernheim
v=
y = f(x) +
I will assume for simplicity that theis distributed identically and inde-
pendently across periods over the interval [, E] and that its distribution
is described by the density function 8().
Each input i depreciates at the geometric rate; the firm undertakes
replacement investment in the steady state. Each period, the firm de-
ducts depreciation allowances A from income in order to calculate con-
ventional corporate income taxes; it deducts A* for purposes of calculat-
ing AMT liabilities (in a steady state, these amounts remain constant
through time).
The conventional tax rate isT,while the AMT rate is i. Under the
conventional tax, aftertax income is given by (1 -T)y +TA - &; for the
AMT, aftertax income is (1 -)y + A* - 6x. The firm actually pays tax
under the rules that yield the largest tax liability or, equivalently, the
lowest aftertax income. Thus, the level of gross income at which the firm
switches from paying taxes under the AMT to the conventional tax is
given by




[(1 - i)(f(x)++-x} O()d
+
f [(1 - T)(f(X)++TA - x] O()d,
- f(x)
and the total value of the firm is
E
1+1p -]
where p is the firm's discount rate (the required nominal aftertax rate of
return on capital), and- is the rate of inflation.
Now we contemplate an incremental increase in some input i at time 0
and allow this incremental input to depreciate without replacement.
Suppose that a $1 investment of this type yields depreciation allowancesIncentive Effects of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax93
of d1 under the conventional tax system t years after installation. For the
AMT, these allowances areThen
dy_f 1








Optimal investment implies that the preceding derivative equals thecost
of a unit of input, which has been normalized to unity. Letting
D =[1
t=o
(and similarly for D), the first-order condition can be rewritten (after
some reorganization) as
={1
[(1 4)TD1 + cbr*D] 1[(1)r+]
To obtain the cost of capital (p), we simply subtract economic deprecia-
tion from this expression for the pretax return (that is,p = f -). This
yields
1 - [(1 - 4)T D + q5r D*]
p =1 [(1 )r+ - & (A.1)
The firm's discount factor, p. depends upon the nominal rate ofreturn
available on alternative investments (i) and thesource of investment
funds. There are three possible sources of funds: new equity, retained
earnings, and debt. A separate calculation is required for each.
I will begin with new equity. Suppose that the expected after-94Bernheim
corporate-tax rate of return on an investment is p.Potential equity-
holders have a choice between financing this project or making some
alternative investment that yields the nominal market rate of return,i (i
= r + ii). Since both p and i measure returnsbefore individual income
taxes, investors will be indifferent only when these two rates areequal.
Thus, the aftertax rate of return on the marginal investment is given by p
= i, as in King and Fullerton. To obtainthe cost of capital under equity
finance, we simply make this substitution in equation (A.1).
Next, consider retained earnings. King and Fullerton arguethat when
the source of finance for an investment project is retained earnings,the
required after-corporate-tax rate of return is given by
.11mi
1L 1zj'
where m is the effective personal tax rate on ordinary income, and zis
the effective personal tax rate on capital gains. The cost ofcapital for
internally financed investments is then obtained from substituting this
expression into equation (A.1).
Finally, consider debt finance. I derive the appropriate rate of discount
for debt-financed investments by modifying the argument usedby King
and Fullerton. Consider some investment that provides a rate of return p
after corporate taxes. If this investment has been financedthrough debt,
the corporation pays interest i per dollar borrowed. Interest payments
are tax deductible, so that expected interest payments,net of tax deduc-
tions, are i(1 - (1 - çb)T - 4r). The investment yields a positive return
to shareholders whenever p exceeds this term. Thus,the firm is just
indifferent toward the marginal investment when
p = i(1 - (1 - - frT*).
This expression defines the firm's rate of discount. The cost of capital for
debt-financed investments is obtained by substituting for p in equation
(A.1).
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